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WHY WE SHOULD IGNORE THE ―OCTOMOM‖ 
Kimberly D. Krawiec 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few familiar with the story of Nadya Suleman—a single, low-income, 
California mother of six who recently gave birth to octuplets conceived 
through in vitro fertilization (IVF)—do not instinctively react with outrage.1  
Fourteen children (or even one) are a daunting number under the best of 
conditions, and the conditions surrounding the Suleman births are far from 
ideal.  Yet, as the old saying goes, ―hard facts make bad law,‖ and Suleman, 
dubbed ―the Octomom‖ by the media, exemplifies the truth of this adage.   
Suleman‘s hard facts have led not only to bad regulatory reform pro-
posals, but also to public fury and social hysteria.  Critics have heaped both 
fascination and scorn on Suleman, and legislators, policymakers, and others 
have called for a variety of new restrictions on the use of assisted reproduc-
tive technologies (ARTs) in response to the Octomom controversy.2   
The most recent and thoughtful of these proposals is from Naomi Cahn 
and Jennifer Collins, who advocate a variety of ART-related reforms, in-
cluding record-keeping requirements, limits on the number of embryos that 
can be transferred during any single IVF cycle, informed consent rules, and 
insurance coverage regulation.3  Not surprisingly, given the high quality and 
inventiveness of prior work from each of these authors, the Cahn and Col-
lins framework for ART governance has much to recommend it.   
 
 
 

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1
  The CDC defines ―assisted reproductive technology‖ as ―[a]ll treatments or procedures that in-
volve surgically removing eggs from a woman‘s ovaries and combining the eggs with sperm to help a 
woman become pregnant.‖  U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 525 (2008) [hereinafter ART SUCCESS RATES], availa-
ble at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf (link).  One of the most common 
ARTs is in vitro fertilization (IVF), which ―involves removing eggs from a woman‘s ovaries, and ferti-
lizing them outside her body,‖ and then transferring the embryos into the uterus.  Id. at 526.  Other 
common ARTs include gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT).  
Id. at 525.  
2
  Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 501 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/22/LRColl2009n22Cahn&Collins.pdf (discuss-
ing the Suleman case and the responses by state legislators, the media, academics, and others) (link).  
3
  See id. 
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I take issue, however, with the Cahn and Collins embryo-transfer limit 
proposal and argue in this response that such a limit would produce fewer 
benefits and higher costs than Cahn and Collins assume.  Moreover, if the 
fertility industry is to be subjected to greater oversight, such oversight 
should stem from a balancing of what is to be gained and lost in the 
process, rather than through a hasty response to a sad and disturbing—but 
aberrant—case.   
Although the total costs and benefits of any reform proposal are ulti-
mately a function of the resulting regulatory operations and are thus diffi-
cult to predict in advance, the likely limits of the Cahn and Collins proposal 
are demonstrated by the regulatory examples they invoke—the British Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the United Net-
work for Organ Sharing (UNOS).  The fact that Cahn and Collins do not 
provide the most persuasive examples in support of their suggested reforms 
does not itself render their proposal flawed.  Yet, an examination of these 
examples demonstrates the meager public health benefits likely to attend 
government-mandated embryo-transfer limits and the high costs of such 
regulation. 
II. THE LIMITED PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS OF EMBRYO-TRANSFER 
LIMITS 
Unlike some of the Suleman-inspired reform proposals, which are de-
signed primarily to protect embryos or to restrict ART access to patients 
meeting certain age, marital status, or income qualifications, Cahn and Col-
lins defend their proposal on the basis of the health risks and public costs 
associated with multiple births from ARTs.4  Currently, decisions regarding 
the number of embryos to transfer and, ultimately, fetuses to carry to term, 
are left to patients and their doctors.  Although the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (SART) have issued practice guidelines in an effort to reduce 
the incidence of multiple births from ARTs, the guidelines are not mandato-
ry and are customizable according to the conditions of the individual pa-
tient.5  Given the mixed evidence on the efficacy of industry self-regulation 
in other contexts, some critics are understandably skeptical that such guide-
 
 
 
4
  For example, a recent Georgia bill supported by pro-life groups was ostensibly designed to reduce 
the risk of multiple births from ARTs by capping transfers at two or three embryos per cycle, depending 
on the patient‘s age.  But, by limiting the number of embryos that could be created in a single cycle to 
the number to be transferred in that cycle (the law also prohibited cryopreseveration or destruction of 
embryos), the legislation actually encouraged, rather than discouraged, multiple embryo transfers up to 
the two- or three-embryo maximum.  See S.B. 169, 2009–2010 Sess. § 19-7-66 (Ga. 2009) (as intro-
duced).  See also infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (discussing the Georgia bill); Cahn & Col-
lins, supra note 2, at 504 (discussing other proposed reforms that would limit ART access to those who 
are married, meet income limits, or otherwise pass some test of parental fitness). 
5
  Am. Soc‘y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines on the Number of Embryos Transferred, 90 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY S163, S163 (2008) (recommending a sliding scale of one to five embryos transferred, de-
pending on the age of the patient, prior success with fertility treatment, and other factors) (link). 
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lines will sufficiently address multiple births from ARTs.6  These fears are 
further fueled by the Suleman case, evidence of lax compliance with other 
ASRM/SART guidelines,7 and rising national multiple-birth rates.  
The national incidence of twins and higher-order (triplet or more) mul-
tiple births has increased substantially in recent decades.8  These increases 
are a cause for concern to health care professionals and policymakers be-
cause the health risks to mother and children increase with each additional 
fetus, often resulting in expensive neonatal and ongoing medical care.  For 
example, twins are seven (and triplets twenty) times more likely than sin-
gletons to die during the first month of life.9  Moreover, multiples are more 
likely to be born prematurely and at low birth weight, leading to a variety of 
complications of the circulatory system, lungs, intestines, eyes, and brain, 
and higher rates of cerebral palsy and other disabilities.10 
In considering the role of ARTs in multiple births, and the potential 
role of government regulation in controlling this problem, it is helpful to 
consider two separate sets of figures: (1) the percentage of total U.S. mul-
tiple births attributable to ARTs, as opposed to other causal factors; and (2) 
the incidence of multiples as a percentage of live births from ARTs.11  The 
first measure provides some indication of the state‘s ability to control mul-
tiple births through embryo-transfer regulation.  As will be seen, although 
ARTs are a contributor to multiple births in the United States (especially 
higher-order multiples), much of the increase in multiple births is attributed 
 
 
 
6
  Cf. Michael Lenox, Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Corporations? The Experience of the 
Chemicals Industry, in MAKING GLOBAL REGULATION EFFECTIVE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WHAT 
ROLE FOR SELF-REGULATION? 62 (Dana L. Brown & Ngaire Woods eds., 2007) (demonstrating the in-
centives and impediments to effective industry self-regulation and reviewing some of the empirical lite-
rature in the field).   
7
  Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte Donors 
1, (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (analyzing a dataset 
of oocyte donor recruitment advertisements in college newspapers and concluding that almost half offer 
compensation in amounts deemed ―inappropriate‖ or ―requiring justification‖ under ASRM guidelines); 
Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2010) (analyzing the websites of 
all SART-member clinics and finding substantial noncompliance with member guidelines on refund 
programs).   
8
  AM. SOC‘Y FOR REPROD. MED., MULTIPLE PREGNANCY AND BIRTH: TWINS, TRIPLETS, & HIGHER 
ORDER MULTIPLES—A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/multiples.pdf (reporting that ―the twin birth rate has in-
creased by more than 50% since 1980,‖ and the rate of higher-order multiple births has increased even 
more) (link); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & NAT‘L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, TRIPLET BIRTHS: TRENDS AND OUTCOMES, 1971–94, at 1 (1997) [he-
reinafter TRIPLET BIRTHS], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_055.pdf (report-
ing similar numbers) (link). 
9
  AM. SOC‘Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 8, at 6. 
10
  Id. at 7–8. 
11
  I rely on various live birth rate measures throughout this section for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing ease of comparability to other relevant measures.  However, live birth measures will, to some extent, 
understate the costs of multiple pregnancies, as not all multiple pregnancies end in live birth.  
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to natural factors and non-ART fertility therapies.  The state‘s ability to 
control the health risks associated with multiple births through embryo-
transfer regulation is, therefore, necessarily limited. 
The second measure, together with other data, goes to the probability 
that governmental oversight of embryo transfer will improve current medi-
cal practice.  As will be shown, the currently low (and decreasing) inci-
dence of higher-order multiple births as a percentage of live ART births 
leaves little room for improving such rates through government oversight.  
There is more room for improvement in twin numbers (though ART twin 
births account for only 16% of the nationwide total).  It is unlikely, howev-
er, that the United States has the political will for the single-embryo transfer 
(SET) limits that have successfully reduced the rate of twin births from 
ARTs in some countries—and with good reason.  
A. National Multiple-Birth Rates 
Multiple-birth rates in the United States have increased in recent dec-
ades.12  Although the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) es-
timate that some of the increase in multiples is due to the fact that women 
today tend to have children at a later age, and older women (even without 
the intervention of fertility treatment) are prone to multiples, the bulk of the 
increase is attributed to the growing use of fertility treatments.13  The CDC 
ascribes a large portion of that increase—particularly in the case of higher-
order multiples—to the use of ovulation-induction (OI) therapies, either 
alone or in combination with intrauterine insemination (IUI), rather than to 
ARTs.14  Embryo-transfer limits thus would have no effect on these major 
contributing factors to rising multiple-birth rates.  
Nonetheless, ARTs are a contributor to multiple births in the United 
States, constituting an estimated 16% of all twin births in 2003, as com-
pared to 63% from natural conception and 21% that are categorized as ―un-
explained,‖ but are attributed to OI therapies not involving ARTs.15  ARTs 
are thought to account for a higher percentage of higher-order multiple 
births, however, representing 45% of triplet and 30% of quadruplet-or-more 
 
 
 
12
  TRIPLET BIRTHS, supra note 8, at 1. 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. at 9 (estimating that one-third of higher-order multiples are the result of fertility-enhancing 
drugs without ARTs).  Cf. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Contribution of Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology and Ovulation-Inducing Drugs to Triplet and Higher-Order Multiple Births—United 
States, 1980–1997, 49(24) MMWR WEEKLY 535 (June 23, 2000), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4924a4.htm (reporting that the lack of reliable in-
formation on the use of ovulation-inducing drugs not associated with ARTs complicates the ability to 
estimate their impact on multiple birth rates) (link). 
15
  Richard P. Dickey, The Relative Contribution of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Ovula-
tion Induction to Multiple Births in the United States 5 Years After the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology/American Society for Reproductive Medicine Recommendation to Limit the Number of Em-
bryos Transferred, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1554, 1557–58 (2007).  This compares to the 1997 rates 
of 11%, 73%, and 16%, respectively.  Id.  
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births in 2003 (a decrease from the 1997 figures of 49% and 54%, respec-
tively).16  In contrast, 18% of triplets in 2003 (20% in 1997) were naturally 
conceived, whereas 37% (31% in 1997) were conceived through OI.17  For 
quadruplet-or-more births, the corresponding figures are 8% for natural 
conception (7% in 1997) and 62% for OI (39% in 1997).18   
These data reveal the first limitation on embryo-transfer regulation as a 
means to control multiple births: by definition, embryo-transfer limits will 
impact only a portion of multiple births, and, in particular, have no ability 
to influence multiple births owing to OI therapies that do not involve emb-
ryo transfer, which currently constitute a staggering 62% of quadruplet-or-
more multiples and 37% of total triplet births.  This alone is not a reasona-
ble objection to embryo-transfer limits that otherwise promise substantial 
public-health benefits, but it is a useful reminder that such limits will not 
fully address rising rates of multiple births in the United States. 
B. Multiple Births as a Percentage of Live ART Births 
The second relevant measure bearing on the likely effectiveness of 
embryo-transfer regulation is the rate of multiples as a percentage of live 
ART births.  Twin births as a percentage of live births from all ART cycles 
decreased slightly and unevenly from 1996 through 2006, from 31% to 
29%.19  Higher-order multiple births as a percentage of live births from all 
ART cycles also decreased during the same time period, from 7% in 1996 
to 2% in 2006.20 
These figures reveal a second limitation on the benefits of embryo-
transfer restrictions.  The currently low incidence of higher-order multiple 
births as a percentage of live ART births—currently 2%, nearly all of it 
triplets21—which has been steadily decreasing since 1996, leaves little room 
for improvement via government intervention.  Naturally, all higher-order 
multiple births are a cause for concern, and I do not mean to suggest other-
wise.  But the rate cannot be brought below zero, and there is reason to be-
lieve that ongoing industry efforts at doctor and patient education, rising 
insurance coverage of fertility treatments, scientific advances in embryo 
culture and preservation techniques, and increased scrutiny due to the 
 
 
 
16
  Id.   
17
  Id.  
18
  Id.  
19
  ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 1, at 76 (reporting twin-birth rates that fluctuate between 31% 
and 32%, then steadily decrease starting in 2002).  This is significantly higher than the spontaneous twin 
rate of about one in 250 pregnancies.  AM. SOC‘Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 8, at 5.   
20
  ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 1, at 76.  This compares to the spontaneous pregnancy birth 
rates of one in 8,000 for triplets and one in 700,000 for quadruplets.  AM. SOC‘Y FOR REPROD. MED., 
supra note 8, at 5. 
21
  Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 14 (reporting that triplets comprised 89.2% 
of all higher-order multiple births in 1996 and 91.2% in 1997); Dickey, supra note 15, at 1558 (reporting 
the percentages of twins, triplet, and quadruplet or more births from ARTs, natural causes, and OI).  
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Suleman controversy may combine to produce further reductions even in 
the absence of new regulation.22 
Moreover, although some experts dispute the contention that twin 
births from ARTs are a negative outcome, the current medical consensus 
both domestically and internationally is that twin pregnancies increase 
health risks to both mother and children.23  If so, then the CDC data suggest 
that the far higher incidence of twins as a percentage of live ART births, ra-
ther than the lower incidence of higher-order multiples, is both the most 
logical source for public concern and the multiple-birth rate most amenable 
to reduction through increased oversight of embryo-transfer practices.  Yet, 
it is unlikely that the United States has the political will for the SET lim-
its—or, even less likely, the aggressive selective fetal reduction—that have 
reduced the rate of twin births from ARTs in some countries.  Tellingly, 
neither have most other lawmakers, including those in the United King-
dom.24  As elaborated below, there are good reasons for this reticence, par-
ticularly in a system of private provision of fertility and other health care 
services, such as exists in the United States.25  But the reality, nonetheless, 
is that the embryo-transfer limits contemplated by U.S. commentators and 
lawmakers are unlikely to significantly impact ART twin rates. 
1. Embryo-Transfer Regulation in the United Kingdom 
Unlike the U.S. system of industry self-regulation, the United King-
dom imposes mandatory limits on the number of embryos that can be trans-
ferred during a single IVF cycle.  Currently, those limits are two embryos 
per cycle for women younger than forty, and three embryos for women for-
ty and older.26  Effective January 1, 2009, HFEA took steps designed to fur-
ther reduce multiple births from ARTs, including a ―One At A Time‖ policy 
that requires fertility centers to document the reasons for transferring more 
than a single embryo in any case where single-embryo transfer is medically 
indicated.27  The policy does not impose a mandatory single-embryo limit, 
however, and does not supplant the existing HFEA two- and three-embryo 
 
 
 
22
  See Am. Soc‘y for Reprod. Med., supra note 5; Zdravka Veleva et. al., Elective Single Embryo 
Transfer with Cryopreservation Improves the Outcome and Diminishes the Costs of IVF/ICSI, 24 
HUMAN REPROD. 1632, 1636–38 (2009). 
23
  Compare, e.g., IFFS Surveillance 2007, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY S19 (Howard W. Jones, Jr. et 
al. eds., 2007) (discussing risks to mother and children in twin pregnancies) (link), and AM. SOC‘Y FOR 
REPROD. MED., supra note 8, at 6–8 (same), with Norbert Gleicher & David Barad, Twin Pregnancy, 
Contrary to Consensus, Is a Desirable Outcome in Infertility, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2426, 2426 
(2009) (arguing that the medical consensus that twin births from ARTs are a negative outcome to be 
avoided is flawed). 
24
  See IFFS Surveillance 2007, supra note 23, at S19–S22 (reporting embryo-transfer limits and 
multiple-birth minimization strategies across nations).  
25
  See infra notes37–38 and accompanying text. 
26
  HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, CODE OF PRACTICE § G.8.5.1. (2008) 
[hereinafter CODE OF PRACTICE] (link). 
27
  See id. at § G.8.5.4–5. 
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limits.28  Although these new single-embryo efforts have not been in effect 
long enough to measure their impact on U.K. multiple-birth rates, an ex-
amination of the impact of the HFEA mandatory embryo-transfer rules sug-
gests several further limitations on the potential benefits of government-
imposed embryo-transfer limits. 
Not surprisingly, regulations limiting the number of embryos trans-
ferred to two or three per cycle have a greater impact on higher-order mul-
tiples than on twin birth rates.  For example, the most recent HFEA report 
shows that higher-order multiple births constitute .33% of live births from 
ARTs in the United Kingdom.29 The corresponding twin rate, however, is 
22.32%, which, though lower than the corresponding U.S. rate, is still sub-
stantial.30  International data reveal a similar trend in other countries: two-
embryo transfer limits primarily impact the incidence of higher-order mul-
tiples, and have little-to-no effect on the incidence of twins.31 
Moreover, another variable—health care benefits that cover fertility 
treatments—may largely drive differences in multiple-birth rates between 
the United States and much of Western Europe, including the United King-
dom.  The United Kingdom, like many countries that restrict embryo trans-
fers,32 provides national health coverage for a limited number of fertility 
treatment cycles, which reduces both the per-cycle success rate in some pa-
tient groups and the economic incentive to transfer more embryos in any 
cycle.33  As a result, lower multiple-birth rates in the United Kingdom may 
be largely a product of health benefit coverage, rather than of government 
regulation.  This is especially true of the twin rate, which is likely unaf-
fected by the two- and three-embryo transfer limits in force in the United 
Kingdom during the relevant measurement period.  Similar reductions in 
 
 
 
28
  Letter from Professor Lisa Jardine, Chair of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, to 
Colleagues CH (08)(03) (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.hfea.gov.UK/489.html (link). 
29
  HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, FACTS & FIGURES 2006: FERTILITY 
PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT 14 (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter FACTS & FIGURES], available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/381.html (link). 
30
  Id. 
31
  IFFS Surveillance 2007, supra note 23, at S19 (noting that the standard practice of two-embryo 
transfer in many countries produces ―the expected marked reduction in triplet pregnancies without a re-
duction in twin rates‖). 
32
  See id. at S14–S16 (documenting national fertility treatment coverage regimes), S20–S21 (docu-
menting embryo-transfer limits across countries). 
33
  The current standard in England is three IVF or intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) cycles 
for women aged 23–39 and meeting the NHS definition of infertility.  Human Fertilisation & Embryolo-
gy Authority, NHS Fertility Treatment [hereinafter NHS Fertility Treatment], 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1896.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (link).  Other U.K. countries offer fewer 
cycles.  Id.  However, implementation, and thus funding, levels vary even across England, meaning that 
in some regions fewer or (rarely) no cycles are funded and many areas have waiting lists.  Id.  See also 
infra notes 39–44 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings in the U.K. system). 
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multiple-birth rates are seen in the United States when ARTs are covered by 
insurance.34   
2. Embryo-Transfer Proposals in the United States 
The above analysis suggests that the U.S. fertility industry is already 
making progress in reducing higher-order multiple births from ARTs and is 
likely to continue to do so.  It further acknowledges that there is more room 
for improvement in ART twin rates, and that if embryo-transfer regulation 
such as that proposed by Cahn and Collins is to effectively address ART 
twin births, then SET is the mechanism most likely to do so. 
Is the United States likely to implement SET limits as a matter of state 
or federal law?  Should it?  Current ASRM guidelines; opposition from the 
fertility industry, consumer interest groups, and many health care research-
ers and policymakers; disagreement on the public-health benefits of manda-
tory SET policies; and the experiences of Georgia and Missouri—states that 
proposed embryo-transfer limits in the wake of the Suleman controversy—
suggest not. 
For example, Georgia Bill 169, originally a far-reaching regulatory 
scheme that imposed significant restrictions on stem-cell research and fertil-
ity treatments—including restrictions on gamete payment and embryo crea-
tion, transfer, and destruction—stopped short of SET, capping transfers at 
two embryos per cycle for women younger than forty and three per cycle 
for women older than forty.35  None of the provisions restricting fertility 
treatments withstood vocal and organized opposition from industry and 
consumer advocacy groups, and the bill now stands as a more limited ver-
sion that prohibits stem cell research.36  The still-pending Missouri bill 
seeks simply to mandate existing ASRM recommendations on embryo 
transfer, which, as previously noted, allow discretion based on each pa-
tient‘s prognosis and history.37  It is thus unclear whether the Missouri bill 
would add new guidance or enforcement powers to the existing ART go-
vernance framework, as state medical boards already have the ability to po-
lice doctors and clinics that disregard professional guidelines and the public 
interest. 
 
 
 
34
  Bart C. J. M. Fauser et. al., Multiple Birth Resulting from Ovarian Stimulation for Subfertility 
Treatment, 365 THELANCET.COM, Feb. 4, 2005, at 7, 
http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art6002web.pdf (link). 
35
  S.B. 169, 2009–2010 Sess. § 19-7-67 (Ga. 2009) (as introduced). 
36
  See Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act, S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2009) (link); Shannon McCaffrey, Georgia ―Octomom‖ Bill Referred for More Study, 
WHITTIERDAILYNEWS.COM, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.whittierdailynews.com/octuplets/ci_11844350 
(discussing opposition to the bill) (link).   
37
  See H.B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009) (link); supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text (discussing current ASRM guidelines).  Another Missouri bill, introduced around the same time, 
would require gamete donor registry and the disclosure of identifying information to offspring.  H.B. 
355, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009) (link). 
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Finally, there are legitimate reasons for the resistance to strict embryo-
transfer limits, particularly given the realities of the U.S. health care system.  
Although fertility professionals have made progress in reducing multiple 
births from ARTs while maintaining pregnancy success rates, their ability 
to do so depends on a variety of factors, including the patient‘s age and the 
underlying cause of infertility, the ability to fund multiple ART cycles, in-
dividual clinical expertise and conditions, embryo quality, and cryopreser-
vation techniques.  Particularly in the U.S. system of private (or private 
insurance) payment for ARTs, under which some customers cannot afford 
multiple IVF cycles, mandatory policies risk reductions in pregnancy suc-
cess rates that some customers will find unacceptable.  It is thus no coinci-
dence that the countries experiencing the greatest success with strict 
embryo-transfer limits are those with both a well-developed and technically 
advanced fertility practice and broad public funding of multiple IVF 
cycles.38  
III. THE HIGH COSTS OF EMBRYO-TRANSFER LIMITS 
Contrary to the assumption behind many proposals to regulate the fer-
tility (or any other) industry, regulation is not free.  Aside from the direct 
costs associated with enacting, interpreting, and enforcing the regulation, 
government intervention frequently is accompanied by delays, uncertainty, 
increased operating and/or production costs, and higher prices.  In many 
cases, these costs are outweighed by regulation‘s benefits.  But embryo-
transfer limits are unlikely to produce substantial health benefits in the 
United States and are likely to impose high costs.  These potential costs are 
illustrated by the two regulatory examples invoked by Cahn and Collins: 
HFEA and UNOS.  
No regulatory system is perfect, and HFEA is no exception.  Although 
U.K. ART multiple-birth rates are lower than those in the United States, 
they are not dramatically so, and these reductions come at some cost to 
pregnancy success rates, at least by some measures.39  In addition, although 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) determined 
in 2002 that funding should be available for up to three IVF or ICSI cycles 
for all eligible patients in England, full implementation of this directive has 
yet to be reached and varies across regions.40  Funding decisions are made at 
the local level by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), some of which fund none, 
one, or two cycles, rather than the recommended three.41  
 
 
 
38
  See IFFS Surveillance 2007, supra note 23, at S19–S21. 
39
  Compare ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 1, at 19 (reporting a live birth rate per cycle started of 
28.6% for 2006), with FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 29, at 9 (reporting a live birth rate per cycle started 
of 24.4% for 2006). 
40
  NHS Fertility Treatment, supra note 33. 
41
  Id.  Wales and Northern Island offer NHS funding for one cycle only and have their own eligibili-
ty guidelines.  Id. 
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Moreover, HFEA rules requiring donor registration and limiting egg 
donor compensation to lost wages and the reimbursement of expenses have 
caused severe gamete shortages,42 and there are waiting times, the length of 
which vary by region, for many patients using public funding for fertility 
treatments.43  Rather than dealing with these waitlists, restrictive regula-
tions, and other impediments to treatment, many British citizens pay out-of-
pocket for treatment or seek less expensive or cumbersome fertility solu-
tions abroad,44 prompting HFEA to recently announce that it planned to re-
visit some of these policies.45   
Cahn and Collins look next to UNOS as a regulatory example, arguing 
that a ―‗quasi-public regulatory system‘, like [UNOS] . . . could be respon-
sible for reviewing appeals from patients who believe they warrant exemp-
tions from the guidelines.‖46  Although it is unclear from their proposal 
exactly how the fertility-UNOS panel would operate, the analogy to the 
U.S. organ procurement system as a regulatory model for the fertility indus-
try is even less persuasive than the HFEA comparison.   
UNOS performs a laudable—and, in many ways, remarkable—
function by procuring organs solely from altruistic donors in the face of 
great social, legal, and political impediments.  But, as is likely to be the 
case with any organization charged with allocating a scarce and life-saving 
resource, the UNOS allocation procedures have come under attack.47   
More fundamentally, the number of Americans on the organ transplant 
waiting list passed 100,000 last year, and thousands of potential organ reci-
pients die each year while waiting.48  With the increasing recognition that 
our current organ procurement system fails to satisfy demand and results in 
unnecessary loss of life, medical professionals, politicians, researchers, do-
mestic and international advocacy groups, and others have called for revi-
sions.  The suggested changes range from presumed consent rules, tax 
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  Mark Henderson, Couples Are ―Driven to IVF Tourism by Ethical Disparities Across Europe,‖ 
TIMES ONLINE, July 2, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article2013609.ece 
(link).  See CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 26, at § S.7.6.6 (on gamete donor payment), § G.5.11.1 (on 
donor registry). 
43
  See NHS Fertility Treatment, supra note 33. 
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  Henderson, supra note 42. 
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  Fertility Donor Pay Debate Call, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8169890.stm (link).  
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  Cahn & Collins, supra note 2, at 509 (quoting Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1648 (2008)). 
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(discussing organ allocation procedures and related controversy) (link). 
48
  UNOS, U.S. Transplant Waiting List Passes 100,000, Oct. 8, 2008, 
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credits, priority for registered donors or their family members on organ 
waiting lists, and a variety of other financial and nonfinancial incentives.49   
Despite the introduction of new legislation and the clear dissatisfaction 
of both the general public and organ transplant professionals, however, the 
current regulatory scheme remains intact, preventing innovation at either 
the state or federal level.  The organ procurement system thus stands as a 
stark example of all that can go wrong with even well-meaning government 
attempts to balance competing private and public interests in the face of 
moral and political disagreement.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
As Cahn and Collins and others have noted, it is worth questioning 
why the Octomom elicited the moral outrage and desire for regulatory in-
tervention that she did.50  Suleman was not the first to give birth to mul-
tiples, or even to octuplets; nor was she the first parent to have children 
(including through the use of ARTs) that she could not support.  Moreover, 
Suleman is an unusual case—how many single mothers, with income insuf-
ficient to support a large family, and who already have six children, will al-
so have sufficient funds for expensive fertility treatments and insist on 
transferring six embryos at once? Suleman‘s story, while regrettable, is not 
worthy of significant regulatory attention. 
Finally, Suleman‘s doctor—currently under investigation by the medi-
cal board of California and ASRM—will in all probability pay a price for 
his actions.51  Doctor Kamrava has had few public defenders within the 
medical community, and the fertility industry cannot be happy with the 
scandal, scrutiny, and increased regulatory threat prompted by the Suleman 
incident.   
This consequence of the Suleman octuplets suggests the most logical 
mechanism for regulating multiple births from ARTs in the United States 
today, given the realities of our underlying health care and political sys-
tems: ex post liability via state and professional sanctions for doctors and 
clinics engaged in irresponsible conduct.  If state authorities and profes-
sional medical bodies have so far been insufficiently attentive in these 
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  See Cahn & Collins, supra note 2, at 501–02; Bridget J. Crawford & Lolita Buckner Inniss, So-
cial Factoring the Numbers with Assisted Reproduction, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2009) 
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tasks, then perhaps the Suleman case and the resulting social and political 
backlash will spur them into action.   
Many health care professionals and policymakers are—like Cahn and 
Collins—legitimately concerned about the public-health effects of multiple 
ART births.  In a perfect world, there may be a regulatory model that max-
imizes public welfare by appropriately balancing this interest against paren-
tal desires and the differing medical needs of fertility patients.   
We do not live in that perfect world.  In addition to the usual regulatory 
problems of institutional competence, bureaucratic red tape, and political 
capture, questions of embryo transfer and multiple pregnancies in many 
countries, including the United States, inevitably intersect with other politi-
cally contentious issues, including the moral and legal status of embryos 
and abortion.   
In the eyes of many, embryo-protection goals are not only worthy and 
important freestanding goals, but ones that should supersede the goal of 
multiple-birth reduction whenever the two conflict.  Because the solutions 
to multiple pregnancies from IVF that are most likely to preserve pregnancy 
success rates include selective fetal reduction, the creation of many em-
bryos from which only the highest quality are transferred, and cryopreserva-
tion of excess embryos for possible future cycles, advocates of embryo-
transfer limits must recognize that embryo-protection goals are not only dis-
tinct from, but are often incompatible with, multiple-birth reduction goals.  
This tension is demonstrated by the experience in Georgia,52 by that of other 
countries, such as Germany and Italy,53 and by Suleman herself, who re-
portedly transferred all of her remaining embryos because she was unwil-
ling to destroy any.54  The political minefields of abortion and embryo rights 
thus render it highly unlikely that the United States will implement compre-
hensive embryo-transfer regulation effectively designed to reduce multiple 
births anytime soon.  
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